Work and Hermeneutics

Foucault brings up a very brief but interesting aspect of "authorship:" The idea of what constitutes his (being the "author," not the scriptor, as Barthes employed) body of "work." "Work," of course referring to the multiple entries that the "scriptor" has manifested, while "dead", under an engendered persona, which, although sharing name, does not play by the same significations of the individual; rather, "Using all the contrivances that he sets up between himself and what he writes, the writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular individuality" (Foucault 905). It seems then that this idea of "work" would fall exclusively under the realm of this "other," this transcendental "author function," as Foucault puts it, rather than the writer himself.

Foucault pushes this into the qualifying realm; what is a work then? "Is it not what an author has written?" (Foucault 905) The simple answer is yes. The manuscripts, the rough drafts, the self publications, the deleted passages, outlines, notes, etc. all would seems to fall the "author function." Yet, even this definition of work has its limits. To use his example, Foucault's discovery of Nietzsche's laundry list (905) would raise the question of, "does this belong?" Probably not, and here's why. While the laundry list is "written" by Nietzsche, it is not written by "Nietzsche" (author function). The laundry list, according to Focault's rules concerning the author function and discourse, would be outside of "Nietzsche's mode of classification.

"The author's name serves to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse: the fact that the discourse has an author's name, that one can say 'this way written by so-and-so' or 'so-and-so is its author,' shows that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely comes and goes, not something that immediately consumable." (907) "The author's name manifests the appearance of a certain discursive set and indicates the status of this discourse within a society and culture." (905)

Basically, based on the significations a specific author function chooses to play by, we are accepting his/her rules, and thus, by their presence, we can verify, who (which author function) is writing/scripting.

After all this bothersome repetition and dullness, this finally leads, in my opinion, backwards, towards the aspect of hermeneutics. What Foucault might be implying is that what is desirable, or necessary for criticism, is the unity and coherence of the author as function through all of his "works." We feel comfort when we can read Joyce by how we are "supposed" to read Joyce, and then find a "universal" meaning, which is "truth" because we have used Joyce's significations and rules. Ong as well might agree, that there is a prescription to coherence; that the director, the scriptor who has engendered the author, has given pre-set positions for his characters, signs, and even his audience, to agree upon.

It seems then, that the idea of what is "good," or "entertaining," in the eyes of those who try to interpret, is how close, or far away it comes from it's predictability. One hand offers up the wisdom that, the more it is similar, or consistent with the character who reports it, the better. The other hand might suggest that to play with the author-function's convention reports more pleasure and discussion. What if, the scriptor decided to never play his "authorship" with the same rules?

Would that be "good?"

Could that be impervious to criticism?

How would one classify that scriptor/author function's body of "work?"